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Do Democratic Candidates Suffer ‘Audience
Costs’?
LIONEL BEEHNER
Yale University
Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science

The literature on “domestic audience costs” focuses mainly on threats made by
democratic leaders to signal credible commitments. Yet it largely ignores pledges made
by democratic candidates along the campaign trail. Candidates often engage in a
rhetorical “arms race” with each other to project resolve to voters on issues of
international relations, whether it is protecting the country, fighting terrorism, or standing
up to foreign aggression. Yet, unlike other audience costs, candidates face a conflict of
preferences based on competing time horizons. That is, the short-term incentives
(winning votes) for taking more hard-line stances can outweigh the long-term costs
(getting boxed in by pledges made). Many campaign promises are mere bluster, but some
can signal to foreign leaders a candidate’s future willingness to fight or back down, with
important implications for crisis bargaining down the road. Using this framework, this
paper analyzes the candidates’ rhetoric regarding foreign affairs during the 2008 U.S.
presidential campaign and the subsequent policy decisions made by President Barack
Obama.1

This

paper seeks to address the following questions: Do threats made by

candidates along the campaign trail signal to foreign leaders their future resolve – or lack
thereof? What costs, whether domestic or international, do these candidates incur for such
rhetorical gamesmanship? Finally, when and under what conditions does a candidate get
boxed in by campaign pledges, and what are the implications? We assume that once
elected, democratic leaders make foreign policy decisions based on sound, rational
calculations influenced by their preferences and those of their constituencies. But the
literature does not take into account that leaders are beholden to previously taken partisan
stances made (often in haste) along the campaign trail that can box them in. I argue that
campaign promises do in fact impose future costs on candidates once in office by boxing
them in.
1

Author can be contacted at lionel.beehner@gmail.com.
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This paper proceeds as follows: First, I review the audience costs literature and
examine how it relates to elections and campaign rhetoric. Next, I outline my theoretical
argument and causal mechanism. Finally, I briefly examine the 2008 U.S. presidential
race, the campaign positions taken by the candidates and their posturing on the wars in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Georgia to determine if their proclamations incurred any future
“audience costs,” 2 and what implications they had for international relations. 3
Literature Review
According to the literature on “audience costs,” democracies are better able to
overcome informational gaps and reveal their true preferences early on in crises, thus
preventing escalation. Facing a steeper cost for waging—and losing—a war than, say,
unelected autocrats, democratic leaders are less likely to bluff or try “limited probes”
during a crisis (Fearon 1994). Voters, especially those concerned about the reputations of
their country, disapprove when their leaders do not follow through on verbal threats made
(Tomz 2007). Conversely, opposing states are more likely to assume that threats made by
democratic leaders are more credible due to their higher “audience costs.” That is, they
would be more likely to see a drop in their popularity or be voted out of office if they
issued a threat and then backed down. Because democracies are better able to signal their
intentions than non-democracies, this greater transparency reduces the security dilemma
between states and lowers the risk of crises escalating into war (Russett, Oneal 2000).
But this theory neglects an important component of the democratic process:
elections campaigns. During election years, candidates make any number of foreign
policy pronouncements along the campaign trail to win over undecided voters. They face
a conflict of preferences based on conflicting time horizons. That is, their first order of
business is to win the election, or at least win over undecided voters in the immediate
2

This paper does not assume that candidates are cynical or irrational and will say anything to win votes or
always take a partisan stance but that their positions do shift depending on what voters want, as the 2008
case of Georgia illustrates.
3
Generally speaking, audience costs theory deals with threats, not promises. For the purposes of this paper,
I will use the two interchangeably, since a candidate who is not an incumbent cannot obviously carry out a
threat until in power. So stump speeches on foreign policy, almost by definition, are promises. I understand
the difference is not just semantic. As Robert Jervis (2002) writes, “I might be believed to be ready to carry
out my promises but not my threats.” Renato Corbetta, in a working paper (“Informal Commitments and
Intervention in Ongoing Conflicts”), finds that states make any number of “informal commitments”; most
just signal “cheap talk” but some of which incurs “reputational costs” to states.
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state they are campaigning in. To do this, they often make statements that project resolve.
In this sense, they are driven by a shortsighted goal. But they also prefer flexibility once
in office to negotiate treaties, bargain with their foreign counterparts, and escalate or
terminate conflicts—in short, leave their stamp on the world.4 They prefer not to be
boxed in. As candidates, they are motivated by ego, ambition, and winning votes, not by
winning friends and allies abroad.5 They face two decisions once in office: They can
renege on their campaign promises and risk alienating voters next time up for office, or
they can follow through on their promises, so as not to lose political capital both at home
and abroad.6
Indeed, the words of candidates signal to foreign states their future willingness to
fight or not fight, should a crisis arise. At the basis of this theory is an audience-cost
mechanism linking a state’s foreign policy with the selection and domestic “punishment”
of its leaders. James Fearon (1994), for example, writes about a dilemma leaders face
regarding misplaced incentives to exaggerate or misrepresent their willingness to use
force or escalate crises. They make veiled public warnings, or deploy or mobilize forces.
The idea is to signal that the preferred course of action for the state is to use force rather
than to make concessions (Fearon 1997).7 This is meant to “demonstrate resolve” in the
face of a threat. The opponent, realizing the credible commitment of the democratic
leader’s action, will either escalate or back down. A leader who chooses to back down is
perceived to suffer a greater “diplomatic humiliation” (Schelling 1960) the more the
crisis escalates. But as a crisis grows, a leader can expect greater reward for standing
firm, provided the state’s opponent backs down. Think of a poker player winning a large
pot after the final round of betting.

4

Notice the media-driven trend ever since Harry Truman of stamping a president’s name with a doctrine,
so we have a “Bush Doctrine,” a “Clinton Doctrine,” and so forth.
5
Note John McCain’s repeated campaign slogan in 2008 of saying the three letters he saw when he stared
into Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s eyes were “K-G-B.” One imagines his rhetoric toward Russia
would have changed and been less caustic if he had won the presidency.
6
This kind of election cost is obviously not present for an incumbent candidate who wins reelection, unless
they are grooming their vice president to follow in their place. This argument is made often to support the
fact that second-term presidents often have very successful tenures in terms of foreign policy, because they
are neither seeking the approval of the international community nor of domestic voters. They also are
worried about cementing their “legacy,” and so look to achieve grandiose bargains of lasting import, like a
Middle East peace deal.
7
Fearon (1997) distinguishes between two different types of “costly signals”: tying hands and sunk costs.
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Thus, state leaders “have private information about their willingness to use force
rather than compromise, and they can have incentives to misrepresent this information to
gain a better deal,” writes Fearon (1994). But the audience costs literature has come
under some intense scrutiny from scholars in recent years for lacking rationalism (Sartori,
2002), for downplaying the importance of an audience’s policy preferences (Snyder and
Borghard 2010), and for lacking plausibility when tested with conflict datasets that
contain actual threats (Downes and Sechser 2011). Also, presidential candidates, though
privy to daily intelligence briefings on national security threats, do not have complete
information. Nor would it necessarily matter, since they may have a private incentive to
exaggerate threats (especially if the threats are perceived to be the responsibility of
botched policies by an incumbent). No candidate in recent history has won an election by
waxing soft or uncertain on perceived foreign threats.8 The result is an escalation of
tough-sounding rhetoric. Much of what gets said on the campaign trail is just rhetorical
noise and “cheap talk” and thus not a credible signaling mechanism of future policies or
preferences. Still, leaders in foreign capitals cannot tell which statements are just
campaign bluster to win votes, and which are genuine policy stances.
Electoral Audience Costs
There are obvious audience costs present during campaigns, though these are
different from those facing democratic leaders once in office. Fearon writes about “public
demands or threats [that] ‘engage the national honor’” if a leader backs down in the face
of a threat made. He argues that domestic audiences “may provide the strongest
incentives for leaders to guard their states’ ‘international’ reputations.” Adds Kenneth
Schultz (1999): “[V]oters are therefore motivated to punish those who sully the national
honor by making public commitments and then failing to carry through on them. Making
a threat and then backing down would be seen by voters —and exploited by challengers –
as a foreign policy failure.” Yet, candidates have private incentives to sound more macho,

8

This is not to assume that all presidential candidates must be anti-war, as the 2012 Republican field of
candidates suggests.
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patriotic, and resolute on issues of national security than their opponent.9 The cost of not
engaging in this rhetorical arms race with one’s opponent may be an electoral defeat.
Thus, like in other cases of crisis bargaining, both camps of a presidential contest may
have hidden incentives to bluff.
There are two audiences for every speech a candidate makes, and they are often in
conflict. The first audience for these pronouncements is undecided voters in key swing
states. According to the Pew Research Center, 63 percent of undecided voters are female,
27 percent are age sixty-five and older, and many tend to be less well educated and more
religious than voters who have already chosen their candidate.10 Scholars find that
domestic audience costs tend to be highest among doves, isolationists, the highly
educated, and Democrats than among other demographic groups (Tomz 2007). This
finding suggests, then, that audience costs would be lower among undecided voters.11
Moreover, empirically we find that a strong, muscular foreign policy sells well to a less
educated American electorate, whose “citizens disapprove of empty threats” (Tomz 2007,
831). That partly explains why candidates drape themselves in the colors of the flag,
surround themselves with military vets in uniform, and make bold declarations of
protecting their country.
The second audience, which candidates often forget, is foreign states. After all,
one of the candidates will prove victorious and become leader, and so both of their
statements are parsed in the international press and can act as signaling mechanisms not
just of future policy preferences but also credible commitments of future resolve – or lack
thereof (if they fail to follow through, this can signal “hollow threats,” which can then be
interpreted that the candidates do not mean what they say or are dishonest).12 The world

9

Recall the most talked-about campaign ad from the 2008 election was Hillary Clinton’s “3 a.m. phone
call” ad, which suggested that her primary opponent, Barack Obama, was untested on issues of national
security.
10
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96403104
11
With Tea Party-mania sweeping U.S. politics, one prediction, given the “audience costs” literature
(Tomz, 2007) is that as American voters lean increasingly isolationist and non-interventionist, then
audience costs can be expected to rise, not drop. The implications, in theory, would be fewer American-led
crises escalating into conflicts. Consider the growing unpopularity of the U.S.-led NATO intervention in
Libya among opposition candidates in the 2012 presidential election and among lawmakers in Congress.
12
Robert Jervis (2002) suggests such explicit signaling of strength may act in reverse. He writes: “For an
actor to claim that it is committed to taking a certain action will increase the costs it will pay if it behaves
otherwise, and if this were the only effect this would increase others' estimates of how likely it is to carry
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influences the election’s participants as much as vice versa. Kristopher Ramsay (2004)
writes that candidates are rational actors aware that the “world is watching,” and so “open
political competition at the national level influences, or gets influenced by, the politics
between states.”13 But foreign leaders do not know these candidates because most enter
elections without a clear record on international affairs. This uncertainty, heightened by
rhetorical gamesmanship made by candidates along the campaign trail, can trigger an
unintended escalation of hostilities and conflicts abroad. A foreign power may dismiss an
ultimatum issued by a candidate as mere bluster or “cheap talk.” After all, because an
opposition candidate cannot mobilize troops or form alliances, it cannot credibly signal
commitments of resolve. “The opposition,” Ramsay (2004) writes, “has no policy lever
that can reveal its competence or one that can undermine the nation's reputation.”
Moreover, given the sheer volume of such pronouncements, the message may fall
on deaf ears abroad.14 Yet because of the 24-hour news cycle that chronicles a
candidate’s every last word, not to mention campaign seasons that now stretch for over a
year, candidates’ speeches are dissected for clues of future behavior. This is not the case
for congressional races. Scholars generally agree it is the executive branch, not Congress,
which controls foreign policy. Congress can erect roadblocks, but it is powerless to
prevent a president from waging war (Howell and Pevehouse 2005).15 Because a
president is the decider when it comes to U.S. foreign policy, foreign governments should
parse his statements as a candidate for signals of resolve, or lack thereof.
Consistency also bedevils candidates for higher office. After all, audience
preferences vary from state to state. What wins hearts in Miami may turn off voters in
Philadelphia. Thus, a rational candidate should tailor their message to the audience whose

out this act. But the fact that the actor felt the need to commit itself conveys information, and others may
infer that only the weak need to try to bolster their resolve.”
13
Ramsay examines the role the opposition plays during a crisis, focusing on the Berlin crisis and
presidential campaign of 1948 and Suez crisis of 1956.
14
During the 2008 campaign, Barack Obama promised to deliver an annual address on U.S. foreign policy.
"I'll give an annual 'State of the World' address to the American people in which I lay out our national
security policy,” he said in an October 2, 2007 speech. Despite the bold promise, he has never delivered
such an address.
15
In their article (International Organization, 2005), Jon Pevehouse and William Howell do not argue that
Congress should be ignored, unlike most of the literature on America’s use of force. Specifically they find
that, at least with regards to major uses of force during the second half of the 20th century, it depends on the
partisan composition of Congress.
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votes are most up for grabs but that also runs the risk of being inconsistent, which can
signal a lack of confidence in foreign matters. Tomz (2007) finds that 72 percent of
respondents complain that inconsistency hurts the reputation and credibility of the
country. It can also result in reflexive speeches by candidates that emphasize “supporting
our men and women in uniform” but by extension, leaving open the specificities, such as
boosting funding for the war effort (which if it includes veterans’ care, supplies, and
troops in the field can heighten the conditions for conflict escalation). Other reflexive
campaign rhetoric can manifest itself in stances against competitors like China or Russia.
A candidate is rewarded for tough-sounding rhetoric by being voted into office. Once in
power, leaders must then either follow through on their campaign promises, or back
down and risk alienating voters and losing reelection in four years.16
According to the democratic peace tradition, democratic institutions promote
peace for several reasons: First, they promote accountability and competition among
parties, which in turn places constraints on the executive branch; they raise the political
risks and costs of waging war (Bueno de Mesquita 1992; Lake 1992); democratic
institutions reveal important information about a leader’s incentives in a crisis and
improve a government’s ability to credibly signal their commitment and resolve (Schulz
1999). Finally, transparent institutions overcome the informational asymmetries that
cause crisis bargaining to break down. But elections do not always comply with this
peace-making calculus. For one, to win votes, candidates make speeches to signal their
strength on issues of national security. They are not thinking about future interactions
with foreign leaders but instead trying to project strength, confidence, and patriotism.
Again, candidates’ short-term goal of winning the election often conflicts with their longterm preferences—to not get boxed in on matters of foreign policy. Yet this projection of
tougher resolve and security, such as building a missile shield in Europe, can be
misperceived as a threat to foreign powers. Because foreign leaders cannot determine
which threats are genuine and which are not, they must assume that a candidate’s rhetoric
will more or less align with future policies, and react accordingly.
16

A classic example is Barack Obama’s January 19, 2008, campaign speech in which he promised to
recognize the Armenian genocide as president. Yet in a statement on April 24, 2009, a day of memorial for
the event, he never mentioned the word “genocide” and he has not officially endorsed a House resolution
recognizing the genocide, ostensibly for fear of upsetting Turkey (Source: Politifact.com).
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According to the “audience costs” literature (Fearon 1994), democratic leaders are
less likely to make threats because they do not want to suffer the domestic backlash for
not following through on their commitment.17 Put another way, domestic audiences can
enhance credibility of our commitments abroad by “punishing leaders who say one thing
but do another.” Conversely, if they do make a threat, a foreign leader is more likely to
back down because they know that a democratic leader cannot back down and thus is
serious about the threat. Where audience costs are low—such as in an autocracy—these
kinds of threats are viewed as less credible because the costs are lower if the autocrat
backs down (North Korea has repeatedly promised to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.”). But
a democratic candidate, unlike a democratic leader, is less bounded. Again, the incentive
to bluff in the short term to win voters is high. Because they are driven by ego and
ambition, the short-term preferences and cost-benefit analysis of democratic candidates
more often mirror those of autocrats than democratic leaders.
Sometimes these statements are bold promises—such as Barak Obama’s promises
to close Guantanamo or to pull combat troops out of Iraq—that line up with a candidate’s
actual policy preferences. That is to say, sometimes pronouncements dovetail with a
candidate’s moral and political philosophy and with their normative view about how the
world should work. But some positions will be formulated based solely on interactions
with their opponent and informed by short-term calculation to appeal to voters in a
certain state or region. Candidates campaigning in southern Florida, for instance, may
privately advocate greater engagement with Havana. But to win Cuban-American voters,
their speech will have to sound hawkish on U.S.-Cuban relations. In recent presidential
campaigns, there are several instances when candidates looking to win voters tended to
take hard-line or hawkish stances when it came to issues of national security, specifically
on prominent issues such as border security, fighting terrorism abroad, or addressing
potential threats like Russia or China. The short-term incentive is to not only exaggerate
perceived threats abroad—whether Islamic terrorism or Russian resurgence—but to
exaggerate their own resolve and determination should a threat emerge.
17

Snyder and Borghard (2009) disagree. They find that audience-cost mechanisms are rare and have a
small effect on crisis behavior. Yes, the public cares “about their country’s reputation and national honor
but independently of whether their leader issues an explicit threat.” But more important, they argue: “[R]eal
audiences care far more about the overall substantive consequences of the leader’s policy, which we call
policy costs, than they do about the leader’s consistency between threats and subsequent actions.”
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Voter preferences, of course, also matter. The public is not always a gun-shy force
for pacifism or a check on democratic leaders’ ability to wage war, contrary to
democratic peace theory. That is because of all-volunteer professional militaries, and the
diminished influence of anti-war groups (Rosato 2003). As one historian noted, “The
American public has wanted only one thing from its commander in chief: quick wars for
substantial victories with minimal costs (Reiter and Stam 2002).
Much also depends on domestic conditions. The literature is divided on the
influence of such conditions on U.S. decisions to use force. Some scholars find that
political leaders “see” opportunities to use force abroad or escalate hostilities when the
domestic economy is not good or they lack a clear plan to rescue the economy (Russett
1990). Others find that electoral cycles have little bearing on a president’s decision to use
force (Gowa 1998). Moore and Lanoue (2003) argue that “international politics, not
domestic politics, [must be] the primary determinant of conflictual U.S. foreign policy
behavior.” Wang (1996) finds that both “internal and international influences operate but
that force is invoked less frequently when elections are near (perhaps because the rally
effect is too unreliable) and more often to avoid a foreign policy defeat that would be
politically damaging than to achieve outright political gains.”
The incentives to push for war ahead of or during an election can vary. Some
scholars suggest that crises abroad can distract voters from a candidate’s lack of domestic
policy experience or declining popularity (or perhaps some scandal). Also, incumbents,
especially those facing sinking public approval ratings, may seek to create a “rally around
the flag” effect (Howell and Pevehouse 2005; Waltz 1967). Exaggerating a foreign threat
or instilling fear can scare up votes. Candidates can signal resolve to voters with tough
rhetoric against foreign enemies.18 John Kerry used this tactic when he repeatedly
criticized incumbent President George W. Bush for apparently not pursuing Osama Bin
Laden in Tora Bora.

18

Much has been made of presidential candidates sounding tough on Russia and China on the campaign
trail, only to cave or be swooned in front of their leaders once in office. Recall George W. Bush’s “looked
into his soul” comment when he met Vladimir Putin in 2000.
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Empirical Cases from the 2008 U.S. Election
This paper will examine two examples from the 2008 U.S. presidential contest,
which dominated the foreign policy agenda: the war in Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion
of Georgia. These case studies provide conflicting outcomes. In the first, President
Obama persisted with his policy despite domestic political costs. In the second, the
president reneged on his campaign promise with little consequence.
The “situation in Iraq” ranked as the most important issue among voters (along
with the economy), according to a February 2008 Gallup poll.19 A subsequent poll taken
in August 2008 found that Republicans, by a margin of two-to-one, rejected a timetable
for withdrawing from Iraq. By contrast, Democrats favored a phased withdrawal by a
ratio of five-to-one.20 Hence, a common talking point of Barack Obama’s campaign was
differentiating the “good” war in Afghanistan with the “bad” war in Iraq. In the words of
the New York Times, Obama’s anti-war rhetoric “electrified and motivated his liberal
base.”21 Contrast Obama’s comments on Iraq with those of his opponent, John McCain.
“The success we’ve achieved so far was not because we were threatening them. The
success we’ve achieved so far is because we told them we were staying…to threaten
withdrawal, frankly, is an option that I would be very reluctant to exercise unless I was
sure that we had no other option, and I think we have lots of them.”22 McCain’s position
was one of not disrupting the status quo, for fear of destabilizing Iraq, while Obama had
carved a position as that of the anti-Iraq War candidate. During the candidates’ second
debate, Obama said “[P]art of the reason I think it's so important for us to end the war in
Iraq is to be able to get more troops into Afghanistan.” He gave a 16-month calendar for
removing all combat troops from Iraq, a pledge he later followed through on in August
2010.23

19

http://www.gallup.com/poll/104320/iraq-economy-top-issues-voters.aspx
http://www.gallup.com/poll/106309/iraq-war-attitudes-politically-polarized.aspx
21
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/us/politics/04military.html
22
Interview with John McCain, New York Times (September 17, 2008):
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/iraq.html
23
In a August 2 speech, President Obama confirmed the end of all combat operations in Iraq but agreed to
leave 50,000-65,000 troops to advise and assist the Iraqi military and government as well as protect U.S.
interests.
20
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Contradicting his exit strategy from Iraq, President Obama’s surge of forces into
Afghanistan has proven more contentious. In a speech delivered back in October 2007,
Obama pledged, “As president, I would deploy at least two additional brigades to
Afghanistan to re-enforce our counter-terrorism operations and support NATO's efforts
against the Taliban.” He also promised to ratchet up non-military aid in Afghanistan to $1
billion. Perhaps most controversially, he said “if we have actionable intelligence about
high-value terrorist targets and [then-Pakistani] President Musharraf won't act, we will.”
The purpose of his speech was less to win voters than to differentiate his counterterrorism
platform from that of his Democratic primary opponent and to sound more hawkish.
In this case, Obama the president followed through on pledges made by Obama
the candidate. He surged 30,000 forces into Afghanistan, put more pressure on Pakistan,
and eventually even carried out his threat to act unilateraly to kill or capture al-Qaeda’s
leader were he provided with actionable intelligence, something his opponents suggested
was naive becaues it would imperil U.S.-Pakistani relations. He did get a small “bump”
in his approval ratings, which rose above 50 percent approval in a May Gallup poll for
the first time in several months.24
Yet the president has suffered audience costs precisely because he followed
through on his promise to focus more on the war in Afghanistan. Over the past few years,
America’s public mood has soured on the war in Afghanistan. According to an August
2009 Washington Post/ABC News poll, 45% of those polled favored a drawdown of
forces in Afghanistan.25 That made the president’s deliberations on the war, particularly
his delicate balancing act between his civilian staff and military generals, a messier and
more drawn-out process than anticipated. Also, his use of unmanned drone strikes against
terrorist targets in Pakistan opened him up to criticism of killing civilians and turning
Pakistanis against America. His speech delivered to West Point cadets on December 1,
2009, was a hedge of sorts: He ordered 30,000 combat troops into Afghanistan but also
promised to begin drawing down forces by July 2011—a promise which he fulfilled.26

24

Gallup poll from May 2011 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/113980/gallup-daily-obama-job-approval.aspx).
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/19/AR2009081903066.html
26
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistanand-pakistan
25
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In this sense, Obama was boxed in by his campaign rhetoric; he could not
credibly draw down forces without reneging on a previously made campaign promise.
That arguably ended up costing him in terms of credibility among voters. A Gallup poll
showed that the public’s approval rating of Obama’s handling of the war had dropped
from 56% in July 2009 to 35% in December 2009.27 It also may have hurt his credibility
in terms of resolve among the military and appearing indecisive among some foreign
leaders. There was dissent within military circles, even forcing the resignation of the
president’s top military commander in Afghanistan. And there was internal backbiting
within his top circle of civilian advisors that negatively affected morale, decision-making,
and public views of the war.28 Internationally, Hamid Karzai denounced the President’s
strategy as an overreach of U.S. military power. In sum, there was a ratcheting up of
expectations by a candidate that in the end proved damaging once in office. That is, his
preferences as a candidate conflicted with his preferences as a commander in chief. By
terming the campaign in Afghanistan the “good war,” Obama could not credibly commit
to a drawdown of forces, without going against his campaign pledge.29
A second case to consider was Russia’s war in Georgia. On August 8, 2008,
Russian tanks rolled into South Osettia, a breakaway province of Georgia. Following the
invasion, there was tit-for-tat rhetorical gamesmanship between the American
presidential candidates to signal support for Georgia and resolve against Russia. Obama
called for both sides to exercise restraint (he was on vacation in Hawaii at the time and
appeared somewhat surprised by the invasion). By contrast, McCain, whose foreign
policy advisors enjoyed close ties with the leadership in Tbilisi, immediately and
forcefully condemned Moscow for its act of aggression. He also placed blame not only
on the Russians but also on NATO for not admitting Georgia. After Russia escalated the
conflict, McCain gave his now-infamous “We are all Georgians” speech, in which he
said, “[W]e learned at great cost the price of allowing aggression against free nations to

27

http://www.gallup.com/poll/124520/obama-approval-afghanistan-trails-issues.aspx
A confidential report by General Stanley McChrystal calling for more forces or else face “mission
failure” was mysteriously leaked to the Bob Woodward of the Washington Post in September 2009
(“McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,” Bob Woodward, Washington Post, September 21, 2009:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html).
29
Arguably a case could be made that the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden provided a window of
opportunity to draw down from a position of strength.
28
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go unchecked. With our allies, we must stand in united purpose to persuade the Russian
government to withdraw its troops from Georgia.”30 Caught off-guard, Obama followed
suit by ratcheting up his anti-Russia rhetoric in a forcefully worded August 12 statement:
“Now is the time for action, not just words. It is past time for the Russian government to
immediately sign and implement a cease-fire. Russia must halt its violation of Georgian
airspace and withdraw its ground forces from Georgia, with international monitors to
verify that these obligations are met.”31
The Georgia issue received considerable attention in the candidates’ second
debate and galvanized the American public. Indeed, the war became a proxy of sorts for
whether the future commander in chief would be willing to stand up to aggression abroad
and “defend freedom.” By a margin of 52 percent to 27 percent, voters supported McCain
over Obama to deal with a resurgent Russia, according to an August 2008 Quinnipiac
poll conducted shortly after the war.32 Interestingly, Obama’s vice presidential candidate,
Joseph Biden, who had previously visited Georgia, sounded decidedly more pro-Georgia
than his running mate. “The war that began in Georgia is no longer about that country
alone,” Biden told reporters at the time.33 “It has become a question of whether and how
the West will stand up for the rights of free people throughout the region. The outcome
there will determine whether we realize the grand ambition of a Europe that is whole,
free, and at peace.” (He later convinced the Bush administration to green-light $1 billion
in emergency aid to Georgia). Similarly, McCain’s running mate, Sarah Palin, made
headlines after hinting in an interview with ABC News’ Charlie Gibson that she would be
willing to “go to war with Russia” to defend Georgia.34 In a further show gamesmanship,
McCain dispatched his wife Cindy to Tbilisi to visit Georgian soldiers. At rallies,
McCain invoked the war in Georgia to demonstrate his opponent’s inexperience to be
commander in chief. “When Russia invaded Georgia,” he told supporters in late August.
“Senator Obama said the invaded country should show restraint. He's been wrong on all
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of these. When I am president, we're going to win in Iraq, win in Afghanistan, and our
troops will come home in victory and honor, not in defeat.”35
The Russian leadership paid close attention to how the war was portrayed by the
candidates. Prime Minister Putin, while at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, suggested to reporters the war had been instigated at the behest of the
McCain camp or then-Vice President Dick Cheney’s office to win Republican votes.
Other countries, following the American candidates’ lead, piled on Russia for trying to
“redraw boundaries.” A few European leaders even threatened sanctions against Moscow.
In response, Russian officials said they would not be intimidated or isolated.
Did Obama’s rhetoric on the Georgian war tie his hands once he became
president? That is, did he suffer any audience costs, whether domestic or international,
for his campaign rhetoric against Russia? On one hand, Obama’s initial call for restraint
proved prescient, as a European Union commission the following year found that both
sides were responsible for the outbreak of hostilities, not just Russia.36 Yet, by ratcheting
up his pro-Georgia rhetoric, Obama found himself in an awkward position once he
assumed office. On the other hand, he quickly went about repairing relations – or as he
put it, “hitting the reset button” – with Russia, knowing that he would need Moscow’s
help to rein in Iran and revise the set-to-expire START agreement. Obama rarely if ever
mentioned Georgia after assuming office, except to dispatch Biden to Tbilisi to deliver a
dose of “tough love” to the Georgians, accusing the leadership of not following through
on democratic reforms. The vice president also did not deliver a package of military
hardware the Georgians desired (Washington also shelved considerations of fast-tracking
Georgia for NATO membership, though the 2008 Bucharest summit had already set back
Tbilisi’s prospects to join the bloc). In short, Georgia was put aside in favor of other
foreign policy priorities.37 In this case, Georgia may prove that candidates do not suffer
great audience costs for reneging on commitments made on the campaign trail.
35
36
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One offshoot to Obama’s position on Georgia was his stance on a missile defense shield in Central
Europe. On September 10, 2008, he told The O’Reilly Factor, “Given what has happened in Georgia, I
think we have to send a clear signal that Poland and other countries in that region are not going to be
subject to intimidation and aggression….I think the missile shield is appropriate. I want to make sure it
works though.” The following September, however, Obama announced a shift in his predecessor’s missile
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Still, the Georgia-Russia war proved to be an instructional litmus test for Obama
as commander in chief. The candidate reacted with a measured response, not a rash rush
to blame one side. That kind of thoughtful discipline has shaped his reactions to crises
abroad. Further, he called for a United Nations Security Council resolution to condemn
the invasion, a move signaling his belief in the normative power of international
institutions.38 Obama reversed course once in office and sought to repair relations with
Russia, which ran counter to his campaign’s tough rhetoric. While the lack of resolve his
Republican opponent accused him of did not go unnoticed in foreign capitals, Obama’s
popularity and political capital abroad were largely unaffected.
Arguably, a case could be made that President Obama suffered audience costs for
his inconsistent position on Afghanistan but not Georgia. Why? First, the stakes for the
American public were higher for the former. The war in Afghanistan, despite the lack of
shared costs, had declined in popularity among many Americans by the time he took
office. Regardless, Obama carried out his pledge to send more forces into the country,
only to begin drawing them down less than two years later. It is uncertain what kind of
reputational costs the United States may suffer, but Obama did endure audience costs in
terms of his sagging approval ratings for following through on his pledge to surge into
Afghanistan, a factor of the conflict’s diminishing popularly among a war-weary public.
By contrast, the war in Georgia was a brief crisis despite the widespread attention it
received during the campaign. Obama reneged on his promise to support Georgia, though
to a smaller degree than his Republican opponent. Once he was elected, President Obama
embraced realism,39 believing that Russian cooperation, arms control negotiations, and
strong bilateral ties outweighed any obligations Washington owed Tbilisi in terms of
military or moral support. The American public barely noticed that he never criticized
Russia for its heavy-handed invasion. But it did penalize the White House (at least in poll
numbers) for its perceived mishandling and escalation of the war in Afghanistan. In this
defense policy that called for scrapping plans for advanced radar in the Czech Republic as well as the
missile defense shield in Poland. Obama instead called for a redesigned system aimed at shooting down
short- and medium-range missiles from sites closer to Iran.
38

http://www.politicususa.com/en/Obama-Russia-Georgia
Obama’s realpolitik, as evidenced by his cozying up to China and Russia, has won him the ire of the
human rights community for not pressing harder on human rights abuses. Obama has favored larger states
at the expense of smaller, more expendable ones. That said, he is not card-carrying realist, given his
statements on the importance of international institutions and his Nobel Peace Prize speech on “just war.”
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sense, Obama was boxed in by his campaign pledge.40 Of course, the reverse argument
could also be made: Had Obama as a candidate promised a tougher U.S. military posture
on Afghanistan, only to pull out forces once elected president, then his credibility among
NATO allies and the military may have suffered.
There is an obvious selection bias with the two cases cited above, which are not
meant to constitute a fair or scientific sample size. The case studies are far from complete
or comprehensive and may not capture public attitudes or preferences, given the
differences in their importance (one is a decade-long war costing thousands of American
lives; the other was a five-day conflict costing hundreds of non-American lives). Nor is it
clear that such election audience costs are generalizable to other democracies, particularly
those with shorter campaigns or parliamentary systems, or where foreign policy is a less
salient issue. Audience costs theorists might dismiss promises made by candidates as too
weak or imprecise to generate audience costs high enough to matter. But the empirical
evidence of recent U.S. presidential elections suggests otherwise. Once elected,
candidates do find their policies affected by commitments made along the campaign trail.
While the above case studies do not provide an exhaustive examination of a candidate’s
audience costs, they do provide new evidence to spur further research on an overlooked
area related to the effects of elections on signaling future strength and weakness abroad.
Conclusion
The effect of campaign pledges made by presidential candidates – and what
audience costs, if any, are incurred – has been under-studied by international relations
theorists. Once in office, democratic leaders can be punished at the polls for backing
down in the face of a crisis or for not following through on a threat. But they often put
themselves in these untenable positions because of hawkish pledges made on the
campaign trail to win undecided voters and one-up their opponents. The 2008 presidential
race is instructive: Barack Obama promised to escalate the war in Afghanistan, a pledge
that boxed him in once, as commander in chief, he sought to draw down forces and the
40

Here I am agnostic whether the surge and subsequent drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan reflected
Obama’s true preferences, or whether they were in response to shifting public moods on the war. What I
am interested in demonstrating is how Obama put lots of capital in the war in Afghanistan, followed
through on his campaign pledge, and was punished.
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war turned unpopular. As a candidate, he also backed Georgia during its August 2008
conflict with Russia, only to turn his back on Tbilisi once in office. For this reversal he
did not suffer any real audience or reputational costs, either at home or abroad. Perhaps
this is because not everything a candidate says is a credible signal of resolve. But once
elected, leaders can and do face audience costs, both domestic and international, for
failing to follow through (or vice versa) on their election promises. Further empirical
research is required to sufficiently test this theory and measure the effects of campaign
pledges on future reputational costs. But the 2008 presidential election sheds some light
on the conundrum candidates face when making campaign pledges on foreign policy,
demonstrating that macho posturing can escalate tensions abroad, heighten conflict, and
“box in” a leader once in office.
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